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Introduction 
This chapter critically considers the ways that the changing values of feminism have 
impacted upon its contribution to criminology.  It draws upon Becker’s (1967) suggestion, 
revisited by Morris, Woodward and Peters (1998) and more recently by Liebling (2001) 
and Cohen (2011), that researchers should ask themselves whose ‘side’ they are taking 
when they conduct research.  The question of ‘sides’, who takes them and when, forms 
the central theme of the chapter, as it mirrors the concerns raised by both modernist and 
postmodernist feminist researchers.  These concerns relate not only to the value bases of 
research (Roman and Apple, 1990; Oakley, 2000; Noddings 2003) but also to the practice 
of power that underpins research and theory generation (Wolf, 1992; Davis 2008).  
 
This chapter interrogates five value related tensions that affect feminist criminology today. 
Inherent within these tensions are concerns about what and how to research and theorise 
women’s criminality and fears regarding the dangers of essentialising female lawbreaking.  
There are calls for a feminist criminology that can challenge not only sexism, but also other 
discriminatory practices within the criminal justice system.  Chesney-Lind (2006) and 
Burgess-Proctor (2006), amongst others, have argued that although age, class, sex, race 
and gender have been applied to understanding crime, such theorising has failed 
adequately to explore the impact of these minoritising factors intersecting. The chapter 
closes by considering how the values within feminism and the intersectional influences and 
the contributions that age, class, sex, sexuality, race and gender have upon crime can 
contribute to the future developments of criminological theorising.  
 
Feminist criminology: introducing five value based tensions 
Feminist criminology is one of many approaches to researching and theorising crime and 
criminal justice.  It is concerned with attending to the complex interplay of social, structural 
and individual factors that constitute and reconstitute gender, gender relations and those 
who commit crime (Miller and Mullens, 2009). While feminist criminology contains many 
different strands or standpoints (Hartsock, 1983; Harding, 1986, Heckman 1997), these 
cohere around a number of central tenets that place gender and gender relations at the 
heart of their theorising. They critique traditional systems of knowledge generation as 
biased towards male experience (Spender, 1981) and seek to explore and theorise 
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women’s experience in their own right, rather than as a deviation from a male ‘norm’ (Daly 
and Cheney-Lind, 1988).   
 
We have identified five value-based areas of tension facing feminist criminology that form 
the bases of discussion within this chapter. While it may be argued that these tensions 
represent merely the ‘tip of the iceberg’, they have a particular salience to the current 
climate within the UK where consideration of equalities and diversities is infusing changes 
to the law, social life and crime, for example, in the influence of the Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000 and the Equality Act 2010 on wider social policy and the criminal 
justice system.   Of these five tensions, two principal areas underlie the remaining three.  
The first questions the primary aim of feminist criminology and it is inextricably driven by 
epistemological and ontological questions. Feminist criminologists have argued for a focus 
on research and theory generation based on the experiences of ‘real’ women (Carlen, 
1983, 1986; Carrington, 1990, 1998; Chesney Lind, 1999). However, others highlight the 
importance of how women are constructed within criminological and legal discourse, and 
the need to make visible and to challenge the structures, discourses and associated 
practices that position and oppress women (Young, 1994, 1996).  This debate is linked to 
a second area of contention arising from differences in the underlying and sometimes 
competing values of feminism and criminology.  Feminism, as a wider discipline, is 
primarily concerned with asking questions about gender and its intersections with race, 
sex and class (Fine, 1992; Miller and Mullens, 2009). In contrast, criminology is tasked 
with the production of generalisable theories of crime which can inform an understanding 
of causes and interventions (Daly, 2006).  
 
Crucially, these two primary frictions have contributed to three, further, value based 
tensions. First, debate regarding whether a ‘feminist criminology’ is achievable or desirable 
and if this is the right way forward to consider the relationship between gender and crime 
(Smart, 1976; Young, 1994).  Concurrent to this tension are concerns about how far 
feminist criminology should seek to research and theorise male lawbreaking (Daly, 2006) 
and the potentially negative consequences of essentialising women’s criminal activity 
(Carlen, 1994) if it does not. The final tension in the chapter explores whether criminology 
should continue to pursue gender-neutral theories of crime and criminality, thus 
maintaining objectivity (or as Rich (1980) critiqued ‘male subjectivity’) and sidestepping 
questions of bias, or, alternatively, explore what can be afforded by pursuing ’gender 
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aware’ theorising.  Before moving on to interrogate these tensions it is important to 
consider how they relate to Becker’s question about whose side we are on. 
 
Feminism within criminology: the taking of sides  
Becker (1967) suggests that what is troubling about the question ‘whose side are we on?’ 
is the subjective concern that research may be accused of being biased, unbalanced or 
unscientific.  He outlines two circumstances in that such accusations might be made, 
drawing a distinction between apolitical and political situations.  These two situations have 
relevance to both the historical and current position of feminism within criminology.   
Becker proposed that accusations of bias are most likely to occur in situations where 
research seeks to give credence to the perspective of a subordinate group within a 
hierarchy.  If, for the purpose of this argument, the discipline of criminology is taken to be a 
‘hierarchy’, where different theoretical approaches are afforded varying levels of 
dominance and credibility, then this definition captures neatly the historical project of 
feminist research within criminology.  
 
Daly (2008:9) asserts that during the 1970s and early 80s; the general aim of first wave 
feminist criminology was to make the feminine visible within the criminological frame; to 
ask ‘where are girls, women, and gender in theories of crime, victimisation, and justice?’  
Encompassed in this aim was the major task of amending the lack of empirical 
understanding and knowledge on female offending and criminalisation (Stanko, 1990).  In 
response to accusations of ‘amnesia of women’ (Gelsthorpe, 2004:4) some criminologists 
during this period sought to address the imbalance by ‘inserting’ women into existing 
criminological theories.  However, this practice served only to conceal women within the 
trajectory of theories established to describe the criminality of men (Gelsthorpe, 2004).  
This first wave research, it might be argued, reflects Becker’s apolitical situation; the voice 
of the subordinate (women) was being attended to but, as yet, the different ‘segments or 
ranks’ within the hierarchy of criminology were ‘not organised for conflict’ (241). However, 
as Evans (1995) has noted second wave feminism emerged with the expressed goal of 
striving for equality, making it clear that feminist criminology would not be apolitical in its 
agenda. Subsequent bodies of feminist research developed focussing on the 
misrepresentation of women offenders, critiquing theories of criminality developed from 
and validated on men (Smart 1976; Campbell 1981) and illustrating the limited relevance 
of such theorising for explaining women’s crime (see for example Smart, 1976 and 
Leonard, 1982).  Consequently, Gelsthorpe (2004) argues, feminist criminology embarked 
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upon an explicitly ‘political project’. This project included making evident women’s 
victimisation (principally in the area of sexual assault and domestic violence), highlighting 
discriminatory practices within the criminal justice system, drawing attention to the 
experiences of female victims of crime and to female victims’ experiences of the criminal 
justice system (Walklate 2001). Indeed as it has developed, through its second and now 
third waves, feminism has not only sought to highlight what is made invisible within 
mainstream theories, but to determine the way that criminology as a discipline might 
progress.  In doing so, it seems placed firmly within Becker’s articulation of politicised 
situations, that he suggests occurs when ‘the parties to the hierarchical relationship 
engage in organised conflict, attempting either to maintain or change existing relations of 
power or authority’ (1967: 241). Indeed it is, perhaps, the very politicised nature of 
feminism within criminology that gives rise to the tensions discussed in this chapter.  
 
Tension one: the ‘real’ and the ‘discursive’  
Becker (1967:244) acknowledged the centrality of questions of ontology that drive 
research and theory generation, arguing that researchers need to attend to ‘openly 
conflicting definitions of reality’. In particular, the likelihood that the knowledge and findings 
arising from their research would inevitably problematise some definitions, thereby 
conferring different value statuses. Such tension is clearly evident in the diversity of ways 
in which feminist theorising has intersected with criminology.  Taking a linear approach, it 
is possible to identify two distinct strands of feminist criminological research: that focussing 
on what Carlen (1987) terms real women, documenting and theorising from women’s 
actual lived experiences; and a second, whose focus lies in making visible and challenging 
the structures, discourses and associated practices that allegedly position and oppress 
women, and exploring how women negotiate and resist these. The former identifies with 
an explicitly realist ontological position, while the second is underlain by a constructionist 
epistemology wherein realism becomes contested and open to critique.   
 
Daly (2004:47) reflects on these two strands arguing that the focus on researching and 
theorising from the lives of ‘real women’ was a logical extension of early feminist research 
that had ‘challenged the Androcentrism of the field, as scholars filled knowledge gaps 
about women law-breakers, victims and criminal justice workers’.  It encompassed 
research into, for example, violence against women, women’s experiences of 
imprisonment (Carlen, 1983; 1987), cultural differentiation in youth justice (Carrington, 
1990) and female gang culture (Chesney-Lind, 1999).  However, Daly suggests that by the 
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1990s, the shift within feminism towards a concern with knowledge production and the 
emergence of postmodernism engendered a focus on how women were constructed within 
criminological and legal discourse.  One example of this is Alison Young’s work (1990, 
1994, 1996) illuminating the impact of culture on the representation of crime and 
constructions of criminality.  This distinction between the real and the discursive, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘intellectual double shift’ (Daly and Maher, 1998:1) is not 
merely a function of changing paradigms and represents an ongoing area of tension for 
feminist criminology.  Miller and Mullen (2009:219) argue that ‘Gender operates not just 
within the practices and organisation of social life, but also within the discursive fields by 
which women (and men) are constructed or construct themselves’. The distinction is also 
exemplified in Smart’s (1995:231) argument that, while it is necessary to explore ‘woman’ 
as constructed within legal and criminological discourse, a discourse analysis of ‘the raped 
woman is of little value unless we are also talking to women who have been raped’.   
Such tension strikes at the heart of feminist values and the unapologetically political aims 
of advancing social justice for women, engendering social change and representing 
human diversity (Eichler, 1986). Consequently, it makes relevant Becker’s point that, when 
research is politicised, ‘judgements of who has a right to define the nature of reality that 
are taken for granted in an apolitical situation become matters of argument’ (239).   
 
Tension two: the competing values of feminism and criminology 
These ‘matters of argument’ that Becker refers extend beyond the ontological to the 
differences in the underlying and sometimes competing value bases of feminism and 
criminology.  As already noted, feminist values arise from its concern with interrogating 
gender, gender order and gender relations (Connell, 2002), how gender intersects with 
race, sex, sexuality, and class (Maher, 1997; Daly and Maher, 1998), how it constructs 
women and men’s behaviour and what part men and women play in this construction 
(Weedon, 1987). In contrast, criminology has been primarily focused upon the production 
of generalisable theories of crime (Daly, 2006) with the effect that theories generated from 
researching men are assumed to accurately account for female crime and female law 
breakers.  Miller and Mullen (2009:219) articulate the effect of these differences, 
suggesting they  
 
 Have led, at times to erroneous charges of polemic bias [although] In fact, the 
 theory/praxis relationship amongst feminist scholars is not strikingly different in 
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 practice from the parallel reality that policy goals also drive much criminological 
 theory and research. 
 
The foundations of such bias, can be understood in relation to Becker’s ‘hierarchy of 
credibility’ where ‘members of the highest group have the right to define the way things 
really are’ (241) since feminist research knowledge casts doubt on the ‘official line’ of 
criminological theory.  However, the accusation of bias does not come merely from outside 
the feminist academy.  For example, despite espousing the value of representing human 
diversity, feminism has not always been successful in addressing intersections between 
gender and other minoritising differences. This was notably highlighted by Crenshaw 
(1993) when she argued that:  
 
 Feminist efforts to politicise experiences of women and antiracist efforts to politicise 
 experiences of 'people of colour’ have frequently proceeded as though the issues 
 and experiences which they detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains.  Although 
 racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they seldom do in 
 feminist and antiracist practices.  
 
Moreover, the explicitly political nature of feminist inquiry has also been a problematic 
value for some feminist researchers.  Haack (2003:15), for example, questions the 
distinction between what she terms ‘politicised inquiry’ and ‘honest inquiry’, suggesting that 
politicised feminist epistemologies can constrain scientific inquiry. What is troubling, she 
suggests, is not the notion of politicised inquiry but the implication inherent within it that 
she calls ‘genuine, honest inquiry is neither possible nor desirable’.  Her comments speak 
to Becker’s concerns that there is danger in assuming that ‘the man (or woman) at the top 
knows best’ (234) and suggests, in contrast to Becker, that while feminist criminologists 
are aware that there are sides to be taken, the decision about which side to take is 
complex and troubling.   
 
Tension three: is a feminist criminology desirable and achievable? 
The third tension relates to the status of feminist criminology within the discipline and has 
been the subject of debate, without resolution, for more than two decades.  As far back as 
1976 Smart asserted that criminology as a discipline might be immune to feminist critique, 
with the result that feminist criminology might become seen as a discrete and token area 
within the discipline.  Her prediction is redolent of Becker’s arguments about the ‘hierarchy 
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of credibility’ that exists within any system or discipline grouping.  If, as earlier in this 
chapter, criminology is taken to be the ‘system’ then Smart’s comments position feminist 
criminologists as in danger of subordination within the system.  This positioning is 
significant given Becker’s suggestion that it is the members of the ‘highest group’ in any 
system who have the power to generate credibility and shape the ‘values’ of the system.  
The impact of this, he suggests, is that ‘We are, if we are proper members of the group, 
morally bound to accept the definition imposed on reality by the superordinate group in 
preference to the definitions espoused by subordinates’ (1967: 241) 
 
Indeed, Daly (2006) argues that by the early 1990s Smart’s initial fears had developed 
further. At question was whether criminology was even a helpful starting point for 
beginning to explore the question of gender and crime and whether a ‘feminist criminology’ 
was possible or even desirable, given the epistemological and theoretical gap between the 
two disciplines. Smart’s concerns were not isolated, since a number of prominent feminists 
writing on criminology have critiqued the two disciplines as fundamentally incompatible 
(see for example Stanko 1993 and Young, 1994).  However, occupying a precarious 
position within a hierarchy is not unfamiliar to feminists working within any discipline or 
system.  Indeed it can be argued that feminists are perhaps better placed than most 
supposedly subordinate groups since at the heart of their value structure is the aim to 
recognise, give voice to those previously unheard or actively silenced and to generate 
knowledge and theory that makes credible what others have marginalised (Cosgrove and 
McHugh, 2000).  This buoyancy is perhaps evident in Gelsthorpe’s (1997:1) suggestion 
that while ‘Doubts are still expressed in conference halls, institutional corridors and class 
rooms (if not in academic papers) as to whether there is such a thing as feminist 
criminology….reports of its death or non existence have been greatly exaggerated’. 
Indeed Walklate (2004:48) writing some seventeen years after Smart’s initial concerns 
were voiced, signposted the impact of feminism, in particular liberal feminism, upon 
criminology.  She suggests that as a result of feminist research there is now ‘a her-story of 
women researching within criminology and a her-story of work addressing female 
offending behaviour’.  Moreover, the election of Lorraine Gelsthorpe in 2011 as President 
of the British Criminological Society would also seem to indicate that feminist criminology 
is not only successfully resisting any attempts at relegation to the subordinate, but is well 
placed to actively impact upon the future shaping of criminology.  
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Tension Four: gender essentialism and the inclusion of male law breaking in 
feminist criminology 
However, proposals about the future ‘shape’ of criminology and the position of feminist 
criminology within the discipline hierarchy, are intimately bound up in a fourth tension; the 
extent that feminist criminology should focus exclusively on female crime and criminality or 
whether its remit should also encompass male law-breaking behaviour. This complex 
tension exemplifies Becker’s question about ‘whose side are we on’ and his arguments 
about how and when charges of bias are made. Brown (1986:35) has highlighted the 
range of problems that arise when feminist criminologists take a side that centres solely on 
the ‘women and crime’ question. One of the risks she identifies is effectively illustrated in 
theorising on imprisonment. The more the issues around women’s imprisonment are 
treated as separate, the further mainstream criminology (or male criminology) is left to its 
own methods, untouched by feminist reproach, and therefore assumed to be accurate and 
inclusive when it discusses criminality. Thus, in Becker’s terms, the ‘status quo’ or current 
‘hierarchy’ of (male dominated) theories is reinforced and supported by the absence of 
critique from within its own ‘ranks’.  
 
Brown identifies a further danger associated with the ‘woman and crime’ perspective to 
criminology that is linked to its very label.  The exclusive exploration of ‘woman’ in this 
body of work postulates that it is possible to substitute the biological classification of sex 
with the socio-cultural category of gender. For example, women’s criminal activity is not 
located within biology, rather it is explained by reference to the ways that women who fail 
to meet stereotypical expectations of femininity are stigmatised and then fall foul of the 
criminal justice system (Walklate, 2004).  In other words, Walklate (2004:14) notes, this 
approach assumes ‘that it is possible to replace biologically rooted understandings (sex) 
with socially rooted ones (gender). Expressed in this way it is a position that hints at 
essentialism’. Thus, in excluding theorising of male crime feminist criminology falls foul of 
its own accusation of ‘gender essentialism’, particularly those strands of feminist 
criminological theory that seek to imply that there is a universal ‘women’s experience’ or 
‘men’s experience’ waiting to be uncovered and theorised (Rice, 1990).  Thus, as Becker 
identifies, it lays itself open to the accusation of bias not based on ‘failures of technique or 
method but on conceptual defects….of seeing things from the perspective of only one 
party to the conflict’ (1967: 245). 
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Carlen (1994) has further questioned gender essentialism and asserts that focussing 
exclusively on the experience of ‘women’ serves to create a premise that the causes and 
responses to female criminality are inherently different to those of men.  Taking 
imprisonment as her starting point, she argues that the focus of the research gaze on 
women’s prisons has been extremely dispersed with assertions of theoretical innovation 
having primarily concentrated on ‘adding in’ demands in relation to class and race (Rice, 
1990) or emphasising the capacity of women’s ‘resistance’ to oppression, for example, 
highlighting the many modes of resistance within women’s prisons (Shaw, 1992).   
Theorising and conceptualising about imprisonment in this manner, Carlen purports, has 
led to prioritising and privileging female gender constructs that are no longer a reasonable 
or sufficient point for understanding imprisonment. Rather, she asserts (Carlen 1994:137) 
that  
 
 Class, gender, race, and racism should still be studied in relation to imprisonment. 
 And the views of prisoners and prison officers should be taken seriously. None the 
 less, let us for a time; at least, give empirical research priority to the prison’s 
 overwhelming power to punish.  
 
In doing so she highlights and privileges concern about the ‘punitive power’ of prisons 
arguing that, rather than focussing on the gender-specific needs of women and male 
prisoners separately, there is a need to study prisons primarily as forms of punishment.  
Thus her arguments illustrate how focussing on taking ‘one’ side or ‘another’ can divert 
researchers from theorising and addressing issues that impact on all prison stakeholders, 
regardless of their supposedly gender ‘superordinate’ or ‘subordinate’ status.  
 
Tension five: gender-aware criminology or gender-neutral theorising. 
Thus, it appears that the future for criminology and feminism within the wider discipline is 
rooted in the development of theorising and research that can offer an integrated approach 
to understanding and accounting for the experiences of men and women, both real and 
discursive. While this seemingly addresses the question of whose side criminology is 
taking, there remains considerable debate regarding whether such integrated theorising 
should be ‘gender- neutral’ or ‘gender-aware’ (Gelsthorpe, 1997).   
 
The gender-neutral hypothesis seeks predominantly to apply traditional theories (for 
example, social disorganisation and anomie/strain theory) developed to explain male 
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criminality, to women. However, this has created a ‘generalisability problem’ (see Daly and 
Chesney-Lind, 1988) as criminologists have tested theories derived from all male samples 
to see if they apply to women (Warren, 1981; Zietz, 1981). Steffensmeier and Allan (1996, 
2000) argue that gender-neutral theories provide explanations of less serious forms of 
female and male criminality, and for differences in such crime categories.  However, Miller 
and Mullens (2009) maintain the weakness of such theories is they fail effectively to 
account for the precise ways that there are gender differences in type, frequency, and 
context of criminal behaviour.  
 
Steffensmeier and Allan (1996) maintain it is possible to develop a unified theoretical 
framework for explaining gender differences in crime that would be compatible with 
gender-neutral theories provided it accommodates four key components. The framework 
should describe both male and female criminality and the ‘context’ of offending, especially 
in terms of serious forms of crime. Routes and pathways into crime are a further element 
and, lastly, the framework should explore the extent that gender differences in crime derive 
from a complex interaction of social, historical, cultural, biological and reproductive 
differences.  In this way, their framework would be gender-aware; incorporating gender 
norms, moral development, social control, sexuality, access to criminal opportunity and 
motivation.   
 
Feminists, like Daly (2006), have critiqued theories that purport to be gender-neutral while 
simultaneously inclusive of a gendered approach as illogical and a contradiction in terms.   
Daly proposes that if feminist criminology is to expand then it must draw upon both 
criminology, through its theories of crime, and on feminism,through its theories of sex and 
gender.  This proposition informs her conceptual schema of four inter-related elements 
that criminology could build theories of gender and crime; gender ratio of crime, gendered 
pathways, gendered crime and gendered lives (Daly, 1998: 94-99). Miller and Mullins 
(2006), drawing on Daly’s notion of gendered lives, argue that, compared with other 
aspects of feminist criminology, this is the most challenging as it requires a focus on 
gender beyond the study of crime. Daly (2006) highlights Maher’s (1997) systematic 
examination of women drug users' complex lives in New York City drug markets in the late 
1980s and early 1990s as exemplifying the scope, depth and the benefits of the possible 
application of a gendered lives approach, whilst simultaneously illustrating the need to 
attend to the intersections of gender, race and class. 
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As these newer strands of criminological theorising extend and develop, seeking to 
navigate the tensions and facilitate a more mutually agreeable approach, it is relevant to 
note Becker’s caution regarding the ‘problem of infinite regress’. There can, he argues, be 
no perfect solution that adequately accounts for all aspects of criminality, all perpetrators 
of crime. Rather, he invites us to ‘meet the demands of our science by always making 
clear the limits of what we have studied, marking the boundaries beyond which our 
findings [or in the case theorising] cannot safely be applied’ (1967: 247).    
 
 
Intersectionality: exploring the possibilities for feminist criminology 
In summarising the arguments presented thus far, the chapter has drawn on Becker 
(1967) to suggest that the place of feminism within criminology and its ability to shape the 
future direction of criminology’s value base and subsequent theorising is intimately tied to 
its politicised nature and the position it can claim within a hierarchy of credibility.  Moreover, 
it has argued that accusations of bias and questions about whose side, individually and 
collectively, feminist criminologists take in their research have been levelled by critics both 
within feminism and the wider discipline. The chapter has demonstrated that an integrated 
approach to accommodating male and female experience of crime and law breaking is 
widely recognised as both desirable and necessary. However, such theorising must be 
able to account for social divisions wider than gender alone.  Drawing initially on Eichler 
(1986), Crenshaw (1991) and, later, on the work of Carlen (1994), it has been suggested 
that if feminism is to maintain its underlying values to represent human diversity, an 
integrated approach must also be able to account for the ways that categories of social 
divisions are expressed, represented and subjectively experienced. This last section of the 
chapter considers the utility of intersectionality as a means of navigating some of the 
tensions discussed.  It aims to illustrate how such an approach might provide a means for 
feminism to negotiate its status within criminology.   
 
As indicated at the outset of the chapter, some feminist criminologists (see for example 
Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Chesney-Lind, 2006) have argued that, while social divisions such 
as age, class, sex, sexuality, race and gender have been individually applied to 
understanding crime, such applications have failed to adequately account for the ways that 
these minoritising factors intersect. Indeed, Walklate (2004) articulates that the margins or 
intersections between race, class, age, gender and sexuality have been ‘blind spots’ within 
criminology. One way that the interface between systems of oppression has begun to be 
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theorised in wider disciplines is through ‘intersectionality’.  The term, while a key feature of 
feminist theorising since the early 1990s, (see Crenshaw, 1991, Hill Collins, 1998, Acker, 
1999, Yuval-Davis, 2006), is still emergent in its application within criminology (see for 
example George, 2001; Brewer and Heitzeg, 2008; Cherukuri et al 2008).  Davis (2008:68), 
acknowledging the extension from Crenshaw’s original conceptualisation, characterises 
intersectionality as ‘the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of 
difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements and cultural 
ideologies and the outcome of these in terms of power’.  She notes that ‘other categories 
of difference’ include (although this is not intended to be an exhaustive list) sexuality, 
disability status, nationality, immigration status, and faith. Davis also notes the confusion, 
both within and external to the feminist academy, regarding the status of the 
‘intersectionality’ concept, illustrating how it has been discussed variously and conflictingly 
as theory, heuristic device and/or a constituent of social, ideological or cultural structures.   
 
This diversity is reflected in some exponents arguing its merits as a means of making 
sense of individual experience and identity whilst others argue that it is more properly an 
element of social structures and/or cultural discourse (Prins, 2006). If this diversity of 
application is construed as flexibility rather than confusion, it would seem to offer the 
possibility to bridge the gap between the real and discursive strands of feminist 
criminological research.  To suggest this is not to ignore the debates that have taken place 
regarding the plurality of ways that intersectionality has been applied and developed (see 
Walby et al 2012), but rather to subscribe to the view outlined by Davis (2008:69) that it is 
‘precisely the vagueness and open-endedness of ‘intersectionality’ may be the very secret 
to its success.’ Embracing intersectionality holds the potential for feminist criminologists to 
theorise and engage with the differences that exist within and amongst women and men in 
relation to crime and criminality.  Thus it bears relevance to the lives of real people while at 
the same time enabling consideration of the ways that women and men are constructed 
and oppressed by discourse (see, for example, Bredstrom's (2006) discussion of the 
relevance of intersectionality to feminist HIV/Aids research).  Indeed, as Phoenix 
(2006:187) suggests 
 
 It foregrounds a richer and more complex ontology than approaches that attempt to 
 reduce people to one category at a time.  It also points to the need for multiple 
 epistemologies.  In particular, it indicates that fruitful knowledge production must 
 treat social positions as relational.    
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Yural-Davis (2006:201) argues that intersectionality holds the promise of ‘a major analytic 
tool that challenges hegemonic approaches to the study of stratification as well as reified 
forms of identity politics’. However, she cautions that this promise is dependent upon a 
thorough consideration of social divisions in their organisational, intersubjective, 
experiential and representational forms. Indeed, she cautions against what she refers to as 
the ‘additive’ application of intersectionality, suggesting that at an ontological level each 
social division manifests differently.  This caution is notable if the historical pitfall of 
criminology; the accusation that the challenge of accommodating difference has been met 
by an ‘add and stir’ approach (Chesney-Lind, 2006), is to be avoided. Thus, the application 
of intersectionality must take account of the mutually constitutive interrelationships 
between categories of social division and how these link with the material structures and 
power differentials that contribute to criminality.  
 
Baca Zinn and Thornton Dill (1996) suggest that the power of intersectionality is achieved 
by theorising gender and each individual’s social location as socially constructed through 
the intersection of race, class, gender and other inequalities; thus all people are therefore 
theorised as experiencing both oppression and privilege. Daly and Stephens (1995) refer 
to this as the ‘both/and’ concept. This approach is resonant of Liebling’s (2001) arguments 
in her consideration of taking sides in research. Drawing on Becker, she asks why it is less 
acceptable to offer appreciative understanding of those who manage prisons than of 
prisoners, as if somehow those who wield power (warders) are not themselves subject to 
the power of others (governors) who are themselves subject to higher power relations.  
Adopting a ‘both/and’ concept has resonance with Liebling’s (2001:473) comment on her 
own experience that ‘it is possible to take more than one side seriously, to find merit in 
more than one perspective, and to do this without causing outrage on the side of officials 
or prisoners’ 
 
Moreover, intersectionality seems to have wide appeal, for example recent work by 
Steffensmeier et al (1998) illustrates how black young men come to be treated most 
harshly at the point of sentencing because their race, age and gender combine to create a 
social location at the margins of multiple, intersecting minority groups.  This would seem to 
demonstrate that intersectionality offers a ‘location’ for theorising crime that can draw 
together otherwise diverse factions within criminology.  Additionally, given its relative 
infancy in development and application to social theory and criminology (Walby et al, 
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2012), scope is offered for feminist criminologists to shape the intersectionality further 
develops as a concept. For example, Walby et al (2012:228) in their critique of 
intersectionality identify the question, ‘how to address the relationship between structural 
and political intersectionality without reducing political projects to social structures?’, as 
currently unaddressed.  Feminist criminology would appear well placed to contribute to the 
further exploration of such an issue.  
 
In drawing the chapter to a close, we return to Becker’s article and the solution that he 
proposes to the ‘whose side are we on’ question.  He concludes that researchers should  
 
 Take sides as [their] personal and political commitments dictate, use [their] 
 theoretical and technical resources to avoid the distortions that might introduce into 
 [their] work, limit [their] conclusions carefully, recognise the hierarchy of credibility 
 for what it is and field as best [they] can the accusations and doubts that will surely 
 be [their] fate’ (1967: 247).   
 
We contend that intersectionality represents a ‘theoretical resource’ that may enable 
feminist criminology to hold to its values; advancing social justice, identifying and critiquing 
the power relations that occur where multiple social inequalities intersect, illustrating how 
those power relations are resisted and challenging the systems that create and maintain 
this inequality. In doing so, they do not uphold intersectionality as a universal panacea for 
the tensions discussed in the chapter, but rather suggest that it offers the means to 
negotiate the complexity these afford.   
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